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Abstract
Background: The chance of an influenza pandemic is real and clinicians should keep themselves
informed about the rationale and science behind preventive and therapeutic principles relating to
an (impending) influenza pandemic.
Discussion: Vaccination is considered the best prevention in case of a pandemic threat and first
choice to contain the impact of a pandemic. Pending the availability of an effective pandemic vaccine,
antivirals are likely the only effective agents for prevention and treatment. When an influenza
pandemic is impending, all interventions aim to prevent people becoming infected and to suppress
replication and transmission of the virus as much as possible. Antivirals will be prescribed to
patients with laboratory confirmed pre-pandemic influenza as well as to their contacts (post-
exposure prophylaxis) which may delay development of or even prevent a pandemic. During a
manifest influenza pandemic, however, there is large-scale spreading of the influenza virus.
Therefore, preventive use of antivirals is less efficient to prevent transmission. Delaying the
pandemic is then important in order to prevent exhausting public health resources and disruption
of society. Thus, during a manifest pandemic everyone with influenza symptoms should receive
antivirals as quickly as possible, regardless of virological confirmation. To ensure optimal
effectiveness of antivirals and to minimize development of drug resistant viral strains, the use of
antivirals for annual influenza should be restrictive. The crucial position of family physicians during
an (impending) influenza pandemic necessitates the development of primary health care guidelines
on this topic for all countries.
Summary: Family physicians will play a key role in assessing and treating victims of a new influenza
virus, and in reassuring the worried well. We outline various possible interventions in the event of
an impending and a manifest influenza pandemic, such as non-medial measures, prescription of
antivirals, and vaccination, and emphasize the need for pandemic influenza preparedness.
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Background
The chance of an influenza pandemic is real. A pandemic
might run a relatively mild course (1956, 1967) or could
have disastrous consequences with public health being
stretched to its limits and beyond (1918) [1]. Therefore,
many countries have drawn up varying strategies to guide
policy in the event of an impending or manifest pandemic
[2]. Physicians must be informed about preventive and
therapeutic strategies in the event of an (impending)
influenza pandemic – strategies that are totally different
from those for dealing with the annual influenza epi-
sodes. This especially applies to family physicians who
will be in the front line during a pandemic.
The emergence of an influenza pandemic
Influenza viruses are continually subject to small muta-
tions. As a result of this so-called antigenic drift, annual
influenza epidemics emerge, requiring annual vaccination
of high risk patients with a yearly adapted vaccine for opti-
mal protection. A totally different situation occurs, when
a new influenza virus turns up through a fundamental
virus mutation or an exchange of genetic material
between a human and an animal influenza virus, against
which we have little immunity or cross immunity. This is
called an antigenic shift. An influenza pandemic can then
result through efficient person to person transmission.
One cannot predict when and where a pandemic influ-
enza virus will appear and what virulence it will have.
However, the risk of human infection with avian influ-
enza is greatest where there is intense contact between
people and poultry such as is common in South East Asia.
For several years, attention has been focussed on the
H5N1 influenza-virus that is circulating, but the emer-
gence of every influenza-A-virus, against which immunity
does not, or no longer, exist can lead to a pandemic. Also
previous and presently no more on a large-scale circulat-
ing viruses, like H2N2, which caused the Asian pandemic
in 1957 and against which the majority of the world pop-
ulation lacks protection, could result in pandemic spread.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined sev-
eral phases before and during an influenza pandemic
(Table 1) [3]. In the pre-pandemic phases (three to five)
there is an increasing degree of pandemic threat. In phase
six there is a manifest pandemic. For the H5N1, we are
currently in phase three. Every pre-pandemic phase can in
principle last for an unlimited period or may be present,
locally, for a short period or not at all; phase six ends after
the final wave, as soon as the pandemic influenza virus
has circulated world-wide and has become a new global
epidemic influenza virus.
Both non-medical interventions, such as social distancing
and public information, as well as medical interventions,
such as antivirals and vaccination, are relevant in the pre-
vention and suppression of an influenza pandemic.
Vaccination
Vaccination is considered the best available prevention in
case of a pandemic threat and first choice to contain the
impact of a pandemic. A vaccine can be developed once
the pandemic virus has been identified, potentially from
Table 1: WHO pandemic phases http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html
Pandemic phases Public health goals
Inter-pandemic period
1 No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. 
An influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may 
be present in animals. If present in animals the risk of human 
infection or disease is considered to be low.
Strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness at the global, regional, national 
and sub-national levels.
2 No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. 
However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a 
substantial risk of human disease.
Minimize the risk of transmission to humans; detect and report such 
transmission rapidly if it occurs.
Pandemic alert period
3 Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human spread, or 
at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.
Ensure rapid characterization of the new virus subtype and early detection, 
notification and response to additional cases.
4 Small cluster(s) with limited human to human transmission but 
spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well 
adapted to humans.
Contain the new virus within limited foci or delay spread to gain time to 
implement preparedness measures, including vaccine development.
5 Large cluster(s) but human to human spread still localized, 
suggesting that the new virus is becoming increasingly better 
adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible 
(substantial pandemic risk).
Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread, to possibly avert a pandemic, 
and to gain time to implement pandemic response measures.
Pandemic period
6 Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general 
population.
Minimize the impact of the pandemic.
Post-pandemic period
Post-pandemic period: return to inter-pandemic period. Return to inter-pandemic period.BMC Family Practice 2009, 10:11 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/11
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phase four onwards. From that moment it is expected to
take at least four to five months before vaccination can be
carried out. As people are lacking any protection against
the new influenza virus, repeated vaccination may be nec-
essary for inducing a protective immunological response.
It, therefore, may take several weeks from the moment of
availability of the vaccine to the stage of clinical protec-
tion. Recently, discussions have erupted about how much
pre-pandemic vaccination with a related strain could con-
tribute to an effective immunity against a pandemic influ-
enza virus [4]. Pending the availability of an effective
pandemic vaccine, antivirals are the only effective agents
for the prevention and treatment of infections caused by a
pandemic influenza virus.
Antivirals
Neuraminidase inhibitors are the preferred antivirals to
delay or suppress an impending influenza pandemic.
Older antivirals such as amantadine are not indicated for
use as monotherapy because of an assumed lack of effec-
tiveness. Neuraminidase allows the replicated virus to
leave the host cell. By inhibiting this enzyme viral circula-
tion is interrupted, resulting in the infection being con-
tained.
Oseltamivir, administered orally and zanamivir, which is
inhaled, are registered both for prevention and treatment.
The preventive effectiveness exceeds the therapeutic effec-
tiveness. There are two types of prophylaxis: prophylaxis
without previous close contact with an influenza patient
(primary prophylaxis) and prophylaxis after contact with an
influenza patient (post-exposure prophylaxis).
Although the preventive and therapeutical effectiveness of
neuraminidase inhibitors has been mainly established
against the currently circulating human influenza viruses
[5,6], their effectiveness regarding a pandemic influenza
virus is theoretically plausible [7]. Importantly, neurami-
nidase inhibitors reduce the concentration of influenza
virus in the mucous membrane of the nose and curtail the
excretion of the virus without, as far as known, inhibiting
the production of virus-specific antibodies [8].
Policy principles with an (impending) influenza pandemic
The policy in the pre-pandemic phases differs fundamen-
tally from that during a manifest influenza pandemic.
With an impending influenza pandemic, WHO-phases
three to five, measures are taken to prevent or delay the
development of a pandemic. All interventions are geared
towards preventing people becoming infected and to sup-
press replication and transmission of the virus as much as
possible. Interventions can be made in the chain of infec-
tion, for example through minimising unprotected con-
tacts with infected poultry, or chance encounters with
patients, and through administering antiviral drugs. These
drugs will be prescribed to patients with laboratory con-
firmed pre-pandemic influenza (treatment) as well as to
their contacts (post-exposure prophylaxis). This may
delay development of or prevent a pandemic [9].
During a manifest influenza pandemic, WHO-phase six,
there is large-scale spreading of the influenza virus and,
therefore, isolation and preventive use of antivirals are
less efficient to prevent transmission. Delaying the pan-
demic is then important in order to prevent exhausting
public health resources and disruption of society. Above
all we have to aim at gaining time for developing, testing
and producing an effective vaccine. Therefore, the Dutch
guideline for family physicians states that during this
phase, everyone with influenza symptoms should receive
antivirals as quickly as possible, regardless virological
confirmation [10]. As a result, patients will be less severely
ill, less infectious, ill for a shorter period, and spreading of
the virus will thus be delayed. As in this phase the pan-
demic virus has already rampantly spread, post-exposure
prophylaxis is not an efficient intervention anymore.
Primary prophylaxis is not advised for the general public
in any of the (pre-)pandemic phases. After stopping the
drugs the person remains susceptible to the virus in the
absence of immunological protection. Moreover, national
stocks of antiviral medicines would likely be inadequate
for this policy.
Implications for today
To ensure optimal effectiveness of antivirals and to mini-
mize the development of oseltamivir-resistant viral
strains, the present use of neuraminidase inhibitors
should be restrictive. With annual influenza episodes,
antivirals have, in practise, only marginal effects on other-
wise healthy immunocompetent people, i.e., reducing the
average duration of symptoms by roughly one day [6].
Therefore, therapeutic use should be limited to people at
high risk of complications. Antivirals as a post-exposure
prophylaxis should be recommended only for residents
and staff of nursing homes and for severely immunocom-
promised patients (e.g., those on chemotherapy), who are
not, or suboptimally protected by vaccination.
Neuraminidase inhibitors do have a potentially favoura-
ble influence on the course of the disease in an individual
patient, but are especially valuable, on a population level,
in averting or delaying an influenza pandemic, provided
antiviral agents are prescribed swiftly and for the correct
indication. Not only doctors, but the general public too,
must be properly informed about this. Giving concerned
citizens antiviral agents in anticipation should be resisted.
It risks leading to incorrect use, reduced effectiveness,
and/or the emergence of oseltamivir-resistant strains ofPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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influenza. Above all, it could give a false sense of security
which may delay reporting of symptoms and launching
effective interventions [11].
Of particular concern is the emergence of fit and transmis-
sible oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) in early
2008, which has by now spread all over the world. The
other seasonal influenza strains (A(H3N2 and B) have
remained sensitive. This stresses the need to implement
real-time monitoring of the effectiveness of antivirals,
both during the current phase, as during a potential pan-
demic.
Family physicians in the front line
Especially during an (impending) influenza pandemic
family physicians will play a key role in signalling pre-
pandemic viral infections, assessing and treating victims
of the new influenza virus, and reassuring the worried
well. This necessitates the development of primary health
care guidelines on this topic in all countries [10,12,13].
These should not only comprise medical and non-medi-
cal interventions, but also address the logistical problems
which will be faced in primary care during an enormously
disrupting worldwide influenza outbreak. Obviously,
these guidelines will have to harmonise with national and
hospital-based policies.
Influenza experts have consistently warned that pandemic
influenza is inevitable. Although we do not know when it
will strike, we should not linger in urging for pandemic
influenza preparedness.
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